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Abstract: Sexual infidelity is widespread, but it is also widely condemned, yet
relatively little philosophical work has been done on what makes it wrong and
how wrong it is. In this paper, I argue that sexual infidelity is wrong if it involves
breaking a commitment to be sexually exclusive, which has special significance
in the relationship. However, it is not necessarily worse than other kinds of
infidelity, and the context in which it takes place ought to be considered. I finish
the paper by looking at how the hegemonic norm of monogamy makes infidelity
both more likely and more difficult to deal with.
1. Introduction
Sarah and Chloe have been together for 3 years and live together. They are
in love and are in a monogamous relationship but not married and without
children. They are happy together and have an equal partnership, sharing
domestic and emotional labour equally and so forth. They both have similar
income levels and are at a similar level of seniority at work. Sarah is away at
a conference in Rome and has a few glasses of wine at dinner. In the hotel
bar that evening, she meets Julia, and they end up having sex. Sarah knows
that she will never see Julia again, because she lives in Italy, and they do not
exchange contact details or even each other’s surnames. Sarah tells no one
about the encounter and returns to Chloe and gets on with their relationship
as if nothing has happened. Sarah’s feelings for her are unchanged, she never
cheats again and Chloe never finds out.
Why Sarah has committed wrong here, and how wrong that is, will be the
focus of the paper. In most Western democracies, sexual infidelity is now
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considered private and not amatter for the law to be involved with. Adultery
was decriminalised in the UK in 1857, and the last European country to
decriminalise was Austria in 1997. It remains illegal in 21 states in the
USA, although it is rarely prosecuted. Nonetheless, it remains a practice
widely held to be immoral, certainlywithinmarriage,with 90%ofAmericans
disapproving of adultery, up from 70% in 1970 (Vitiello 2017, p. 317). It is
also widespread; many of us are, or have been, sexually unfaithful, and/or
have been (perhaps unknowingly) on the receiving end of sexual infidelity.
Yet despite the prevalence of, and damage caused by sexual infidelity, rel-
atively little philosophical analysis has been done on it.1 Perhaps this is be-
cause it is taken to be obviously wrong. However, the reasons for its
wrongness are not straightforward. It might seem self-evidently wrong be-
cause it involves other wrongs, such as commitment-breaking, and often de-
ception, but we tend to think that its wrongness extends further. It is
generally held that there is something distinctively wrong about sexual infi-
delity, as opposed to other kinds of infidelity.
In this paper, I argue that sexual infidelity is wrong if it involves breaking a
commitment to be sexually exclusive, and this commitment has special sig-
nificance in the relationship. However, it is not necessarily any worse than
other kinds of infidelity. Furthermore, both the individual and the broader
context in which it takes place ought to be considered. Sexual infidelity is
committed against a background where there are limited options for people
who want to have long-term, intimate, loving relationships but not be mo-
nogamous. This likely increases the prevalence of sexual infidelity, because
some people will find monogamy unsatisfying, but also find themselves un-
able to engage in consensual non-monogamy. In addition, the hegemonic
norm ofmonogamymeans that some people take a breach of it to have a sig-
nificance that a given instance might not have and thus can lead to it being
more painful than it needs to be. Therefore, although sexual infidelity is of-
ten a wrong, it is often not as wrong as it is sometimes held to be.
This paper will have the following structure. In Section 2, I clarify my
terms and give some background detail on the prevalence of sexual
infidelity. In Section 3, I assess what it might be that makes sexual infidelity
wrong. In Section 4, I explore the social context in which sexual infidelity
takes place and argue, that in some cases, this context goes some way in
mitigating the wrong.
2. Background
2.1. CLARIFICATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
In this paper, I will be focussing on sexual infidelity within monogamous re-
lationships, that is, sexual activity that one has with someone while being in
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a monogamous relationship with someone else.2 Sexual infidelity can also
take place in non-monogamous relationships. For example, three people
might be in a polyamorous relationship but agree to be sexually exclusive
to just the three of them and one sleeps with someone else, or two people
might be in an open relationship but promise not to have sex with any mu-
tual friends and one breaks this promise.Most of my discussion, for simplic-
ity, but also because, statistically, most romantic relationships are at least
purportedly monogamous, will focus on the monogamous case. However,
it is important to remember that this is not the only form that sexual infidel-
ity can take.
Of course, ‘sexual activity’ is a contested term, and to provide a full defi-
nition of it is beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, instead, I will rely
on our common grasp of the term,with examples being vaginal and anal sex-
ual intercourse, oral sex, mutual masturbation, BDSM and potentially
phone sex and ‘sexting’.3 By ‘monogamous relationship’, I mean a
two-person romantic relationship in which the partners have agreed, implic-
itly or explicitly, to love only each other romantically, and to have sex with
no one outside of the relationship. I am conceiving of a romantic relation-
ship as a relationship that is similar in kind to a marital relationship, al-
though I do not want to limit my discussion to marriage.4 It might be
worse to commit sexual infidelity if you are married, but as it seems obvious
that one can be sexually unfaithful when not married, the wrongness of sex-
ual infidelity cannot depend on themarriage contract. It is partly for this rea-
son that I am using ‘sexual infidelity’ instead of ‘adultery’, which has
connotations of extramarital sex, but also because ‘adultery’ is often
interpreted more broadly than just sexual infidelity.
Further, sexual infidelity can, and often does, have aggravating factors,
which make it a far more serious breach of obligations to one’s intimate
partner and deepen the betrayal. One of these aggravating factors might
be that the partners are married, as marriage, for some people at least, en-
trenches the obligations you have towards your spouse, and might also in-
clude religious reasons to not commit adultery. Other ‘aggravating factors’
could involve the unfaithful partner failing to fulfil other obligations to the
relationship, for example, the unfaithful partner using shared finances to
pay for hotel rooms to sleep with his or her lover or the unfaithful partner
engaging in a protracted period of deception, perhaps involving third
parties. My discussion will focus on the act of sexual infidelity itself, not
on the aggravating factors. This is because the purpose of this paper is to iso-
late what could be distinctly wrong with sexual infidelity itself, and how bad
that wrong is, even in the absence of other wrongs.
In addition, sexual infidelity often takes place in relationships with un-
equal power structures; indeed, perhaps most romantic relationships are un-
equal in some way. Sexual infidelity is much more problematic when the
relationship is unequal, and the partner with the most power is unfaithful,
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particularly if the inequality means that the other partner would have great
difficulty exiting the relationship. It is also much more problematic if one
partner has greater opportunity to commit sexual infidelity than the other,
for example, if one partner is at home looking after the children, while the
other is often working away. As I take unequal power structures in romantic
relationships to be a serious issue, and abuse of one’s power in an intimate
relationship to be a serious wrong (although a full discussion of what this
means and why it is would require a paper of its own), for clarity, in this pa-
per, I will assume that the romantic relationship in question is an equal one. I
understand that this might mean that a lot of my discussion will jar with
some people, who find it unhelpful to discuss ideal relationships rather than
actual ones.5 However, as the purpose of the paper is to look at the wrong of
sexual infidelity in itself, I need to assume that there are no other issues ac-
companying it. This is why I am using the Sarah in Rome case as the ‘prime
case’. The rest of the discussionwill focus on this kind of case, although I will
consider other examples as well.
2.2. THE PREVALENCE OF SEXUAL INFIDELITY
Sexual infidelity has almost certainly occurred for as long as monogamous
institutions have been in place, and it continues to occur, probably in all cul-
tures, even when it has been illegal and punishable by death. It is difficult to
knowwith any certainty what percentage of people commit sexual infidelity,
but studies suggest it is relatively high in the UK and USA, at least. Some
example statistics are as follows: a Gallup poll in 2008 found that 54% of
Americans knew someone with an adulterous spouse (Jones 2008). Judith
Mackay, a senior advisor for the World Health Organization, found in
2000 that 50% of Americans and 42% of British people aged between 16
and 45 had been sexually unfaithful (Mackay 2000). A study in 2006 found
that 70% of American dating couples reported at least one incidence of infi-
delity in their relationship (Allen and Baucom 2006). In addition, research
suggests that men and women now engage in infidelity at similar rates
(Fincham and May 2017). This is perhaps because of women now having
greater opportunity to be unfaithful than previously.
Of course, it would be a mistake to think that its prevalence justifies it. Ly-
ing is undoubtedly more common than sexual infidelity, but that does not
give us reason to abandon truth telling as an ideal or to fail to condemn ly-
ing. However, the commonness of sexual infidelity does tell us that monog-
amy, while seeming to be a widely held ideal (as we saw above, 90% of
Americans disapprove of adultery), is something either we are very bad at
or that it is not actually held in as high regard as it might seem. Either
way, its commonness calls for greater clarity over why sexual infidelity is
wrong and how serious a wrong it is.
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3. Why might sexual infidelity be wrong?
3.1. HURT
A striking feature of sexual infidelity is the degree to which it hurts and the
degree to which people, including those who have never experienced sexual
infidelity, seem to understand the hurt and see it as reasonable. Indeed, up
until 2010, the defence of provocation could be used in the UK if someone
killed their spouse because of their sexual infidelity. Of course, sexual infidel-
ity has such extreme consequences only rarely, but it is not uncommon for it
to lead to divorce or the dissolution of a relationship when the sexual infidel-
ity is found out. A summary of research into infidelity from 2017 found in-
fidelity to be the top cause of divorce in the USA (Fincham andMay 2017).
The 2008 Gallup poll mentioned above found that 62% of Americans would
leave their partner for being unfaithful, and 64% would never forgive them
(Jones 2008). Ending a relationship, of course, can be a huge upheaval.
There might be children involved, shared property, shared finances, shared
friends, and a shared life together, so for sexual infidelity to cause the end
of the relationship, especially if it was otherwise good, shows how significant
it is taken to be. When it does not lead to the end of a relationship, it still fre-
quently has detrimental effects. A survey of marital therapists in the USA
carried out in 1997 reported that, second to physical abuse, extramarital af-
fairs were the most damaging problem to relationships (Whisman
et al. 1997).
Therefore, sexual infidelity causes hurt and thus might be said to be wrong
because by committing it, the unfaithful partner hurts someone, and this per-
son is someone to whom they have significant obligations and whom them
purportedly love. As Bonnie Steinbock puts it: ‘to cheat on one’s spouse in-
dicates a lack of concern, a willingness to cause pain, and so a lack of love’
(Steinbock 1986, p. 13).
However, there are two related problems with this explanation of its
wrongness: (i) If wrong, sexual infidelity is wrong even if it does not cause
pain; (ii) if their hurt is reasonable, they are hurt because they are wronged,
not wronged because they are hurt.
3.1.1. If wrong, sexual infidelity is wrong even if it does not cause pain
If wrong, sexual infidelity seems wrong even if the person cheated on never
finds out and so is not hurt. If not, then unfaithful partners who never get
caught would not have done anything wrong, and it would seem strange
to have done something wrong only if you are not good enough at deceiving
your partner. Sexual infidelity might also be said to be wrong even if the per-
son cheated on finds out, but is not hurt, perhaps because they have also
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been cheating, or because they simply do not mind. It might be objected that
it is wrong because there is always a possibility of the person being cheating
on finding out and being hurt, but this seems to get things the wrong way
around, implying that if you can ensure that they will not find out, then
the infidelity is unproblematic. Here, I draw on David Archard’s work on
the wrongfulness of rape, whereby he argues that the hurt caused by rape
is evidence of its wrongfulness, but not constitutive of its wrongfulness, as
we can conceive of a ‘hurtless rape’, such as when a woman is drugged
and raped but does not remember the rape and never finds out about it
(Archard 2007, pp. 379–380). In such a case, the woman is still wronged, al-
though not hurt, just as the romantic partner could bewronged by a ‘hurtless
infidelity’, where they are cheated on but never find out. Similarly, if sexual
infidelity is wrong, then the hurt it causes will be evidence of its wrong but
not constitutive of it.
3.1.2. If their hurt is reasonable, they are hurt because they are wronged, not
wronged because they are hurt
This leads to the second issue: It seems odd to say that the person who is hurt
by sexual infidelity is wronged because they are hurt; rather, if their hurt is
reasonable, then they are hurt because they have been wronged. I said above
that sexual infidelity often causes the dissolution of a relationship, but this is
usually because it is considered a grave wrong. To hurt someone, even some-
one you love, is not always morally wrong. For example, it might not be
wrong if what you have to do in order to not hurt them places an unreason-
able burden on you, if you were not able to do what was required to avoid
the hurt, or if you were not aware of what was required, and could not have
reasonably be expected to have known or find out. Sometimes, the person
hurt is wrong to be hurt. A very possessive boyfriend who does not want
his girlfriend to talk to any other men might be hurt when he sees her talking
to a male work colleague. However, what he needs her to do in order to
avoid hurting him is unreasonable so should not count as a reason for her
not to talk to other men. Similarly, a person who has freely consented to
be in an open relationship with their partner might be hurt when their part-
ner has sex with someone else, but this hurt, while understandable, is not in
itself a reason to accuse their partner of having done something wrong.
Therefore, if the hurt caused by sexual infidelity is part of the reason for
its wrongness in a given instance, the hurt must be justified, and this justifi-
cation will need to be something other than the hurt itself.
A further problem with the idea that sexual infidelity is wrong because it
causes hurt is that there are morally dubious reasons for which one might
be hurt by sexual infidelity, which we might not want to pander to. One
might question the wrongness of sexual infidelity by looking to the history
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of marriage and monogamy as a way of controlling women’s sexuality, in
order for men to ensure that their children really were their children, but
also, perhaps, because monogamous marriage is a way of gaining property
rights over one’s spouse. John McMurtry advances this kind of critique of
monogamy, arguing that monogamous marriage serves the capitalist order
in various ways, including preserving the principle that some people can ‘le-
gally acquire the use of other people’s personal powers fromwhich theymay
exclude other members of society’ as ‘husband and wives contractually ac-
quire for their exclusive use their partner’s sexual properties’
(McMurtry 1972, p. 597). On this reading, sexual infidelity would be wrong
because it denies a person their right to exclusive use of their property, and
the person who has been cheated on is justified in being hurt because of this
denial. However, this is a bad reason to be hurt and so the hurt might not
count as a reason to be sexually faithful.
In addition tomorally dubious reasons to be hurt by sexual infidelity, peo-
ple who have been cheated on are often hurt because they see the sexual in-
fidelity to have certain meanings or implications that the unfaithful partner
may not see it as having. People who have been cheated on often see it as a
great betrayal, a humiliation, an indication of a lack or loss of love, a sign
that the relationship is over and that they are not ‘enough’ for their partner,
and so on. The cheater, on the other hand, may see it as ‘just a drunken mis-
take,’which ‘meant nothing’. I will discuss the disjunct between the way that
the unfaithful partner and the partner who has been cheated might see the
significance of sexual infidelity in the final section of this paper. For now,
it is enough to say that this disjunct makes it harder to assess its wrongness
based only on how much it hurts the person cheated on. If Chloe is hurt
when Sarah has cheated on her because she believes it means that Sarah
no longer loves her, when Sarah in fact does love her very much and did it
because she was drunk and wanted to feel young and desired again, then
there is a sense in which we can say Chloe’s hurt is misplaced.
Thus, although hurt is, of course, part of the story, sexual infidelity, if
wrong, is wrong not only because of the hurt caused by it. The hurt is evi-
dence of the wrong of sexual infidelity but requires further elucidation to ex-
plain why it is justified.
3.2. DECEPTION
I cannot give a full account of the wrong of deception here. There are many
types of deception, and it is contentious whether all deception is wrong. For
the purposes of this paper, it will suffice to say that deception is wrong if it
shows a lack of respect for the deceived person and/or if it makes their life
go worse for them that it would have gone were it not for the deception. If
sexual infidelity involves deception, which it often does, then the deception
will be a wrong-making feature of it. As Richard Wasserstrom puts it, ‘lies,
WHY, AND TOWHAT EXTENT, IS SEXUAL INFIDELITYWRONG? 7
© 2020 The Authors.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly published by University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
half-truths, clandestine meetings, and the like may become a central feature
of the adulterous spouse’s existence. These are things that can and do hap-
pen, and when they do they make the case against adultery an easy
one’ (1998, p. 142).
Deceiving one’s partner about one’s infidelity might be considered to be a
kind of manipulation,6 a way of getting one’s partner to act in certain ways
through false beliefs. By deceiving one’s partner into believing that they are
in a sexually exclusive relationship, the unfaithful partner manipulates their
partner into continuing to act as if they are in a sexually exclusive relation-
ship, when in fact they are not. It may seem too strong to suggest that Sarah
in our example is deliberately manipulating Chloe. Nonetheless, any sexual
infidelity involving deception is a form of ‘free riding’, hence the term
‘cheating’. By committing sexual infidelity while pretending to be monoga-
mous, the unfaithful partner gains the benefits of his partner having sex only
with him (unless his partner is also secretly committing sexual infidelity) and
the benefit of having sex with someone else. Even if this is not his intention,
he ‘free rides’ on a monogamous agreement. This is not fair on the partner
who is playing by the rules on the assumption that they both are; as
Wasserstrom notes, it might have been hard for that partner to restrain him-
self, and he may have done so only on the proviso that his partner was too
(Wasserstrom 1998, p. 141).
Furthermore, if deception is involved, then the unfaithful partner also de-
ceives their partner about the significance of the sex that they have. If Sarah
andChloe are in a sexually exclusive relationship, when they consent to have
sex with each other, they do so on the understanding that the sex they have is
exclusive. Sex can be a different experience when it is exclusive. If, when you
consent to sex, you do so with the belief that your sex is exclusive, you do not
consent to non-exclusive sex, which might, for you, come along with a vari-
ety of different and unpleasant emotions, such as anxiety or insecurity.7
In addition, for some people, the exclusivity of the sex will make it a more
special experience. Hallie Liberto argues that this view of sex objectifies our
romantic partners: ‘When we treat our partner’s sexuality as more valuable
to us because access is limited, thenwe treat it in the sameway that we treat a
privately owned painting’ (Liberto 2017, p. 411). There is truth in this, and
often people do have problematic possessive attitudes towards their part-
ners, which make them desire monogamy. However, for some people, exclu-
sivity just makes their sex more intimate and important, in a similar way to
how sharing secrets can feel more intimate and important the fewer people
know about the secret. In any case, if, as a couple, you decide to be sexually
exclusive for particular reasons, such as to express love, or to be symbolic of
your togetherness, then these reasons will be part of the background to your
sexual activity. Therefore, if you find out that your partner has cheated on
you, and lied about it, you might feel that the sex you had together did not
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have the meaning you thought it did, and this could feel like a serious be-
trayal and/or disappointment.8
Therefore, it is wrong to deceive your partner about your sexual infidelity.
However, this raises a further question over whether it is the deception that is
doing the wrong-making work rather than the sexual infidelity. Presumably,
in most cases, the reason why the unfaithful partner is deceptive about their
infidelity is precisely that the infidelity is deemed to be wrong, but if it is
wrong even without deception, then deceptionwould be an ‘aggravating fac-
tor’, rather than intrinsic to the wrong. Furthermore, of course, sexual infi-
delity need not involve deception: Sarah might tell Chloe as soon as she gets
home about Julia. She might even tell Chloe before she sleeps with Julia that
she plans to do so, and she might tell Chloe that she is happy for her to sleep
with someone else too, thus avoiding the charge of trying to free ride on her
monogamy. If, although, Chloe did not give her permission for her to sleep
with Julia, then she has still cheated on her, even though there is no decep-
tion involved and her intention is not to ‘free ride’ on their monogamous
agreement. In addition, in some cases, sexual infidelity might seem worse
when it does not involve deception. Suppose Sarah cheats on Chloe in front
of her face; this could seem more callous and humiliating for Chloe than for
her to do it discreetly. While this does not show that it is always worse to tell
one’s partner if one has cheated on them, it does show that it is not clear-cut
that cheating-with-deception is always worse than cheating-without-
deception.
In addition, as I will argue later, the dominance of the norm ofmonogamy
makes it particularly difficult for people to be honest about their infidelities.
Therefore, although it is a serious wrong to lie to someone about being un-
faithful to them, we should also consider the context in which ‘lies, half-
truths, and clandestine meetings’ take place, as people would likely be more
honest about their infidelities were the norms governing relationships differ-
ent. I discuss this in the final section of the paper.
3.3. COMMITMENT-BREAKING
As I have shown above, hurt and deception are not essential components of
sexual infidelity, nor do they explain what constitutes its wrongness, al-
though they might make a given instance of it worse. There are two essential
parts to it: it is a kind of infidelity, a broken commitment, and it is sexual. In
this section, I deal with the broken commitment; in the next, I look at why it
being sexual might be significant. What unites all cases of sexual infidelity,
including those cases that do not involve deception, cheating, hurt, or other
aggravating factors, as well as those that do, is that they are cases of a bro-
ken commitment.9 The ‘infidelity’ part of sexual infidelity depends on there
being a commitment to be faithful to.
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Wasserstrom argues that sexual infidelity is prima faciemorally wrong be-
cause it involves promise breaking (Wasserstrom 1998). However, a promise
to be sexually exclusive is not often explicitly made by couples. Therefore, it
makes more sense to see it as a commitment, which may be tacit, and not
clearly defined but rather based on conventions associated with romantic re-
lationships. This makes it particularly difficult to assess morally.
Nonetheless, breaking a commitment seems to be at the root of the wrong
of sexual infidelity. However, the commitment is not just any old commit-
ment. Sarah might break her commitments to Chloe all the time: She might
break her commitment to spend less time at work, to domore housework, or
to go with Chloe to visit her mother every Sunday. The commitment to be
sexually faithful is different. It is generally held to be an extremely important
commitment, such that breaking it might lead to the end of the relationship.
However, there is often confusion over what this commitment amounts to.
This is at least partly because few couples actually work that out together
and, instead, just readily accept the convention that their relationship will
be monogamous. Of course, being sexually faithful means not having sex
with anyone outside of the relationship, but does itmean notwanting to have
sex with anyone else too? Are you more faithful if you never want to sleep
with anyone else, or if you want to all the time but manage to control your-
self? There is also the issue that this commitment will bemuch harder to keep
for some people than for others. Some people are not interested in having sex
with anyone else, perhaps they are not very interested in sex at all, or they
just really like monogamy. Others get a lot of value out of having sex with
a variety of new people. Some people might never have the opportunity to
have sex with anyone else; others might have opportunities all the time. By
way of comparison – it is much easier to promise to not drink alcohol if
you do not like alcohol, or you live in a society which forbids it, than if
you are part of a culture in which alcohol is an integral part, and you love
drinking. It seems plausible that the differences between people’s disposi-
tions, values, and situations ought to be taken into account in amoral assess-
ment of someone who breaks the commitment to be sexually faithful. In the
final section of the paper, I will discuss how the dominance of the norm of
monogamy might be taken into account when assessing how wrong an in-
stance of sexual infidelity is.
There is the further complication that the commitment to be sexually ex-
clusive is often not made explicitly, with there being no commitment for-
mally made, and couples merely assuming that it is implied by the
conventions of the sort of relationship they are in. Even if they have made
an explicit commitment, theymight not have not discussed what the purpose
or meaning of the commitment to be sexually exclusive is or if there are any
cases in which it is ok to break it. This is strange for something so significant
that it could cause their relationship to end. Without really understanding
the purpose of a commitment, it is difficult to assess how wrong it is to break
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it. Suppose Chloe makes a commitment to Sarah that she will give up drink-
ing. There are many reasons for which she might do this. She could be
converting to Islam; she could be an aggressive drunk; shemight need to lose
weight; it might just be that Sarah does not like her drinking. The reason
why she breaks the commitment is also crucial to howwe assess the morality
of what she’s done. She might have changed her mind about converting to
Islam; she might be toasting her sister’s wedding; she might be drinking
purely to annoy Sarah. Therefore, the broken commitment will have a dif-
ferent significance to their relationship, depending on why she made it in
the first place and on why she breaks it.
Similarly, there are various reasons why a couple might commit to be sex-
ually exclusive: They might be doing it for religious reasons; they might be
married and believe that marriage is necessarily monogamous; they might
be too jealous to be non-monogamous; they might do it to express their love
for each other. They might also just be monogamous without really consid-
ering why. If the purpose of the commitment has not been reflected upon, or
discussed, it is difficult to make a full moral assessment of what breaking it
entails. It could be that the person who was sexually unfaithful simply did
not think sexual fidelity was that important, or perhaps they assumed the re-
lationship was non-monogamous. This is part of the reason why sexual infi-
delity might be taken more seriously in marriage, if exclusivity forms one of
the marriage vows then it is clear that it is an expected and significant feature
of themarriage, but even then, the couplemight not have thought about why
monogamy is an expected feature of marriage and what significance it will
have to them.
Thus, the obligation to be sexually exclusive is more significant if the cou-
ple in question has discussed, negotiated, and freely committed to being sex-
ually exclusive for reasons important to them. It is, therefore, easier to assess
why an instance of sexual infidelity is wrong, and, indeed, the wrong is likely
to be more serious (all else being equal) when an explicit commitment has
been broken. This can be a reason why sexual infidelity in polyamorous re-
lationships, which generally involve more explicit communication about the
boundaries of the relationship and the feelings of those involved, might be
experienced differently (and perhaps as worse) compared with when it oc-
curs inmonogamous relationships. In any case, in order towork out whether
the commitment to be sexually exclusivemight be particularly important, we
need to consider the significance of sex and sexual exclusivity, to which I
now turn.
3.3.1. The sexual part of sexual infidelity
If there is to be something distinctive about sexual infidelity, as opposed to
other kinds of broken commitments, it will have to be because of the
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meaning or significance of sex. One approach would be to argue that to have
emotionally insignificant sex outside of a relationship would be to show that
the sex within the relationship is also emotionally insignificant. Fiona
Woollard and Bryan Weaver advance this kind of view, arguing that the re-
quirement of monogamy is justified if both partners see sex as being tied to
emotional intimacy in general and if they decide to limit their relationships
of erotic love to one. If they see sex in this way, then ‘sexual activity becomes
conceptually inseparable from the kind of emotional intimacy that is associ-
ated with erotic love’ and ‘sexual activity without this emotional intimacy is
hurtful to the other spouse’ (Woollard andWeaver 2008, p. 515). If partners
see sex in this way, then for one partner to be sexually unfaithful will be hurt-
ful to the other. This is because either the unfaithful partner has been emo-
tionally intimate with someone else in a way associated with erotic love
(and, therefore, presumably, their love for their partner is not exclusive)10
or because they have shown, through having non-intimate sex, that the sex
they have with their partner does not have such significant emotional impor-
tance. This is because, their non-intimate sex shows that, for them, sex is not
‘conceptually inseparable’ from emotional intimacy.
Although I think thatWoollard andWeaver are right to acknowledge that
any justification for monogamy will need to make reference to the signifi-
cance of sex to the partners, I do not agree that it is reasonable to assume
that one’s partner having non-emotionally significant sex with someone else
entails that the sex within the relationship is any less significant, and so I do
not think the justification is quite right. It seems unreasonable to presume
that a person is psychologically incapable of having sex, which is loving
and intimate in their long-term relationship but not loving and intimate in
another scenario, such as in our example of Sarah’s one-night fling in Rome.
Woollard and Weaver observe that their justification for monogamy relies
on it being reasonable to attach emotional significance to all sex. However,
they also acknowledge that there are different ways of conceiving of sex, and
that not all spouses will conceive of (all) sex as being connected to emotional
intimacy. They suggest that if spouses do not conceive of sex outside of the
relationship to be emotionally significant, then this way of seeing sex is com-
patible with non-monogamy (Woollard and Weaver 2008, p. 516).
However, if there are different ways of conceiving of sex, it seems unrea-
sonable for a person to refuse to acknowledge this and to instead choose
to attach a single meaning to all sex acts. If sex can have different levels of
significance, it is conceivable that it could have different levels of significance
to the same person in different circumstances. Therefore, seeing the sex you
have with your partner as emotionally significant does not automatically en-
tail that the sex you have outside of your relationship will also be emotion-
ally significant. Furthermore, having emotionally insignificant sex outside
of your relationship does not imply that the sex you have in your relation-
ship is any less significant to you. It might have this implication; the sex
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you have had with another might make you realise that you do not care
much for your partner or for the sex you have with them. However, it could
alsomake you realise howmuch you love your partner andmake the sex you
have with them even more emotionally significant to you.
In addition, Woollard andWeaver do not discuss cases where one partner
changes their mind about the significance of sex or when they have never
agreed. It is likely that many couples have different views about the signifi-
cance of sex, and even when they do share the same view, there is always the
possibility that one of them (but not the other) will change their mind. Sup-
pose Clive and Jemima both believe that all sex is emotionally significant.
They thus decide to be monogamous because they assume that to have sex
outside of the relationship would imply that they loved the person with
whom they had sex, and they do not want any additional relationships of
erotic love. However, one night, Clive has drunken meaningless sex at a
party with Francine, and realises that sex can have different meanings as
he still finds the sex he has with Jemima to be emotionally significant.
Jemima might be reasonably hurt, for many reasons, at his transgression
here, but it would be unreasonable of her to insist that the sex Clive had at
the party entails either that he loves Francine or that the sex he has with
Jemima means nothing.
Nonetheless, there is an indisputable way in which the sex between Clive
and Jemima has changed – it is no longer exclusive. Thus, in order to exam-
ine why sexual infidelity might be wrong, rather than focussing just on the
significance of sex to the couple, we need to look at the significance of sexual
exclusivity. As I said above, sex when exclusive might be a very different ex-
perience to someone compared with non-exclusive sex, and so when some-
one has been deceived into thinking they are having exclusive sex, this is
particularly problematic. However, even if there has been no deception,
the person cheated on might feel wronged, and reasonably so, because they
have had no say in the decision to make the sex with their partner non-
exclusive, and this might affect the way that they feel about the sex they have
with their partner. If agreeing to have sex exclusively was a decision they
made together, the decision for their sex to no longer be exclusive ought to
be made together too.
As I will now argue, a commitment to be sexually exclusivemight bemade
for good reasons. Below, I summarise my views as to why, for some couples,
the commitment to be sexually exclusive might be important, reasonable,
and compatible with love.
First, sexual exclusivity can be a way to try to maintain love by keeping
partners together. Sex can lead to love, or to the redirection of one’s atten-
tion, and so prohibiting sex outside of the relationship can be a way to try
to hold the relationship together, providing a degree of security to the cou-
ple. One simplistic way that sexual exclusivity maintains love is because,
as Wasserstrom puts it, ‘if one consequence of being married is that one is
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prohibited from having sexual intercourse with anyone but one’s spouse,
then the spouses in a marriage are in a position to provide an important
source of pleasure for each other that is unavailable to them elsewhere in
the society’ (Wasserstrom 1998, p. 149). However, as Wasserstrom high-
lights, this sort of explanation is not necessarily an argument for the immo-
rality of adultery, for it merely shows that sexual exclusivity can have an
instrumental role in holding relationships together (Wasserstrom 1998, pp.
149–150). If Sarah decides that sexual exclusivity is not having this instru-
mental role, perhaps it is, instead, likely to make them break up, because
she wants so much to try sex with a different person, then, by this explana-
tion of the importance of monogamy, it seems that perhaps she ought to
sleep with someone else.
However, the role of sexual exclusivity in a relationship might maintain
lovemore than just instrumentally. It might have an expressive and symbolic
function too. Loving relationships are hugely important to us, but are also
fragile, and we are vulnerable within them because we care about the other
person, and their evaluation of us, but we cannot directly control how they
feel, or indeed, even know how they feel for sure. In addition, we know that
our partner could leave us at any time. Because of the difficulty in knowing
how one’s partner ‘truly feels’, as well as the oft-cited difficulties people have
expressing how they ‘really’ feel to their partners, people often use expressive
or symbolic action to help. Certain actions or sacrifices can help to show
how significant someone is to us, and there are societal conventions that help
us to do this. Setting aside certain activities to be shared exclusively is one of
the ways that we can show strongly how much another means to us
(McKeever 2017, p. 372). Sex has various qualities, such as being intimate,
pleasurable, and involving vulnerability and care, that make it a particularly
appropriate vehicle for expressing love, as well as a means of building love
(McKeever 2016). People also tend to see it as a valuable part of a romantic
relationship, as Woollard and Weaver rightly acknowledge. Thus, a couple
might choose it as an activity to share exclusively as a symbol or expression
of the strength of their exclusive love for one another (McKeever 2017). If a
couple see sex in this way and have agreed to share it exclusively as a way to
show to each other and to third parties how important their relationship is,
then there does not seem to be anything unreasonable about them making
the commitment to be exclusive or to agreeing that a decision to change
the agreement should be a decision they make together.
Thus, if the couple have explicitly agreed to be sexually exclusive, and for
this exclusivity to have a symbolic or expressive function, then for one part-
ner to be sexually unfaithful is wrong, and the person cheated on is justified
in feeling hurt. They are breaking a meaningful agreement without the con-
sent of the other in the context of a relationship in which both partners are
somewhat vulnerable. This might be one reason why we see sexual infidelity
as a distinct kind of infidelity.
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY14
© 2020 The Authors.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly published by University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
However, it is not necessarilyworse than some other kinds of infidelity in a
relationship; neglecting one’s partner, for example, is also a kind of infidelity,
in that the neglectful partner has broken an (implicit) agreement to attend to
and care for their partner (McKeever 2017, pp. 364–366). Furthermore, as
the previous discussion has shown, themorality, or lack thereof, of sexual in-
fidelity becomes much murkier when there has been no explicit agreement
over what sexual exclusivity means to the couple. In addition, if the couple
does not have sex, and have not done for a long time, then it is much more
difficult to give an account ofwhat iswrongwith one of themhaving sexwith
someone else that does not rest purely on jealousy or their exclusivity being
an instrumental way to keep them together. Finally, as Liberto highlights,
sexual exclusivity is not necessarily the best way to communicate love
(Liberto 2017, p. 412). Indeed, its expressive and symbolic function will de-
pend, not only on the wider culture in which the couple lives, but also on var-
ious other factors, including their own personalities and values, and their
views on sex are likely to change over the course of their relationship. There-
fore, although partners might be justified in being hurt over sexual infidelity,
it is not, in all cases, as serious as wrong as it is sometimes taken to be, andwe
should bemuch less hasty in condemning adulterers without knowing the full
situation. In the next section, I will discuss how the norm ofmonogamy con-
tributes to both the prevalence and pain of monogamy.
4. Sexual infidelity and the norm of monogamy
So far, I have tried to provide some clarification over when, why, and to
what extent, sexual infidelity might be wrong. I have argued that it is prima
facie wrong to deceive one’s partner about sexual infidelity and prima facie
wrong to break an explicit commitment to be sexually faithful. However, I
have also shown that the situation is complicated. To fully understand sex-
ual infidelity, and why it hurts so much, we need to consider the context in
which it happens. It occurs within a culture that has certain standards,
norms, and values for what types of relationship are acceptable and what
these relationships should be like. Historically, adultery law favoured men
over women. For example, in England until 1923, although men could di-
vorce their wives on the basis of a single act of adultery by his wife, a hus-
band committing a single act was seen by the law as ‘a regrettable
mistake’ (Vitiello 2017, p. 315).
Moreover, in most Western, mainstream societies at least, there is a hege-
monic norm of monogamy that governs romantic relationships. It is espe-
cially important to acknowledge this norm because many relationships
involve only a tacit commitment to be monogamous and the relationship
is assumed to bemonogamous because it is the type of relationship governed
by the norm of monogamy. This norm is both a cause and a consequence of
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the widespread, yet false, belief in two hypotheses that Carrie Jenkins iden-
tifies as ‘moral monogamy’ and ‘modal monogamy’. Moral monogamy is
the hypothesis that ‘the onlymorally permissible romantic love relationships
are monogamous ones’. Modal monogamy is the hypothesis that, ‘the only
metaphysically possible romantic love relationships are monogamous ones’
(Jenkins 2015, p. 175). The hegemonic norm of monogamy has also been
called ‘mononormativity’. In what follows, I show how the hegemonic norm
of monogamy increases both the prevalence and pain of adultery, through
decreasing people’s options to be consensually non-monogamous and pro-
moting ideas, such as that sexual infidelity is a sign of a lack of love, which
make sexual infidelity more painful when it does occur.
4.1. THE HEGEMONIC NORMOFMONOGAMYMAKES IT VERY DIFFICULT
TO PRACTISE CONSENSUAL NON-MONOGAMY
If you want to have a particular kind of intimate relationship that involves
love, sex, commitment, a shared life, it is very difficult, in most Western
mainstream cultures at least, to find this unless you are prepared to be in a
monogamous romantic relationship. In addition to being mononormative,
our society is, as Elizabeth Brake calls it, amatonormative: we prioritise ro-
mantic love over other kinds of caring relationship (Brake 2012). Although
people, of course, have caring relationships that are not romantic, such as
friendships and familial relationships, Brake argues that the societal assump-
tion ‘that the most valuable relationships must be marital or amorous de-
values friendships’ (Brake 2012, p. 5). Therefore, it is difficult to access all
the goods that come alongwith caring relationships outside of a romantic re-
lationship, and it is difficult to have a romantic relationship that is not mo-
nogamous. This is not to say that we should abandon monogamy or
romantic love. Many people find great value and purpose in being in a mo-
nogamous romantic relationship, and many people are sexually and emo-
tionally satisfied by monogamy. However, it is also likely to be true that
people have different dispositions regarding sex and that some people will
find that they are unfulfilled by being permitted to have sex with only one
person for their whole life.
It is, of course, possible to be in a polyamorous relationship, and some ev-
idence suggests that people are becoming more tolerant and open to such
relationships.11 However, many people will not find that this is a realistic op-
tion for them. Polyamory is still stigmatised, andmany people have negative
associations with any kind of non-monogamous arrangement. For example,
some people might assume that the alternative tomonogamy is promiscuity,
sexual infidelity, or polygamy, which they associate with polygny and op-
pression to women. Polyamorous people are sometimes seen as obsessed
with sex, selfish, immature, or ‘unable to commit’. Even putting these nega-
tive associations aside, many people do not believe that polyamory ‘works’.
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A survey carried out byMarisa Cohen in 2016 suggests that people perceive
monogamous couples to have higher relationship satisfaction than people in
polyamorous relationships (Cohen 2016). However, a review of research, ex-
ploring the associations between consensual non-monogamy, psychological
well-being, and relationship quality, found that polyamorists and monoga-
mists have similar levels of psychological well-being and relationship quality
(Rubel and Bogaert 2015). This suggests a disconnect between many peo-
ple’s perception of how polyamory works and how it actually works.
Even if you are willing to put up with the stigma, it is hard to meet people
whowant a polyamorous relationship, and society, with its focus on ‘the cou-
ple’, is not well set up for people in polyamorous relationships. If you are in a
monogamous relationship, as mentioned earlier, it is not always possible to
ask for a non-monogamous arrangement without making your partner feel
rejected. For some people, for their partner to even suggest this would seem
like a betrayal and could spell the end of their relationship (McKeever 2017).
None of this justifies sexual infidelity, but it does give us some insight into
why it is so common, and why deception often goes along with it. Sex and
love are two of the most important things in many people’s lives, and if
the only way that we can access them is via a monogamous romantic rela-
tionship, but such relationships are notoriously bad at providing long-term
sexual (and also often emotional) satisfaction, then unsatisfied people have
three options: (1) stay in the relationship without being fully satisfied, (2)
break up, or (3) commit sexual infidelity. None of these are ideal. If it was
more socially acceptable to practise consensual non-monogamy, there
would be a fourth option open to people in relationships which are not fully
satisfying. This could allow people to remain in their relationship without
betraying their partner and could ultimately lead to greater overall
satisfaction for both partners.
Breaking up is often not an option for all kinds of reasons, some emotional
and some practical, and undoubtedly, many people stay in long-term rela-
tionships that are not sexually satisfying to them. Indeed, a study carried
out in 1994 of 3159Americans aged 18–59 found that almost 15%ofmarried
people had not had sex in the previous year (Laumann et al. 1994). A quali-
tative study carried out in 2008 looking at how people in sexless marriages or
long-term relationships feel found that many felt frustrated, depressed, or
rejected. For example, one man said ‘it has a deleterious effect onmy overall
life. I dwell on sexual thoughts and fantasies. I am depressed. My profes-
sional life is impacted… This detracts from the time I should spend on work
related activities.’Another woman was quoted as saying ‘I’m depressed and
frustrated, I don’t feel worthwhile anymore’ (Donnelly and Burgess 2008, p.
528).However,mostwanted to stay in their relationships, speaking of shared
commitments and love for their partner holding them together, although
26% had had an affair (Donnelly and Burgess 2008, pp. 531–533).
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In addition to people in sexless relationships, there are numerous other
people who are having sex, but find it unsatisfying, or who would simply like
to have sex with other people. While sexually exclusive sex in a loving
relationship is valuable and may be felt to be important, there is a kind of
value that can be found in having sex with someone new that cannot be
found in a long-term relationship. The new person chooses you as a person
to have sex with. They do not have sex with you to express love, or because
they have committed to have exclusive sex with you. This can provide a
sense of validation, a feeling of being desired and recognised. The sex might
also be of a different kind to the sex you have with your primary partner. As
Mike Martin notes ‘many people find joy in extramarital sex, and for some
the joy may be the greatest they find in life’. He also highlights how ‘some
marriages are sexually frustrating or damaging in other ways to self-respect’
and ‘more than a few individuals report their extramarital affairs were
liberating and transforming’ (Martin 1998, pp. 160–161).
This is not a trivial matter. A large number of people are unfulfilled
and unhappy in monogamous relationships, some of whom are dealing with
that lack of fulfilment through sexual infidelity, which might hurt their
partner, and create feelings of anxiety and inner conflict and ultimately
could lead to the end of an otherwise strong and important relationship.
Adulterers are often vilified and ostracised from social groups, and people
cheated on often lose confidence and feel humiliated. Although, of course,
unfaithful partners are not blameless, sexual infidelity would no doubt
be less prevalent if there were more realistic options to engage in consensual
non-monogamous arrangements.
4.2. THE HEGEMONIC NORM OFMONOGAMYMAKES SEXUAL INFIDELITY
HARDER TO DEALWITH FOR ITS VICTIMS AND FOR ADULTERERS
Not only does the cultural dominance of monogamy probably make sexual
infidelity more widespread, but it also likely makes it into a more painful ex-
perience for all involved when it does occur. It does this, first, by making un-
faithful partners much less likely to be honest about their infidelity,
compounding the wrongness of their infidelity with deception of their part-
ner, and making it more hurtful if it is found out. Second, the norm of mo-
nogamy leads some people to believe that sexual infidelity must have
‘meanings’ and significance that it might not in fact have to the person
who has committed the infidelity. This can lead to divergences in under-
standing between the unfaithful partner and the person who has been
cheated on. For example, people who have been cheated on often take their
partner’s infidelity to be an indication of their partner no longer loving them,
or having never ‘really’ loved them. Another commonly held view is that be-
ing cheated on shows that someone is not ‘enough’ for their partner.12 These
ideas are related to ‘really love’ someone is sometimes thought to mean that
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they are ‘enough’ for you, an idea promoted by the norm of monogamy. As
Erik Jansson Bostrom puts it, there are ‘two interconnected ideas from the
monogamous worldview: first of all, the idea that two people can be enough
for each other. Second, that two people should be enough for each other’
(Jansson Bostrom 2017, pp. 91–92). Thus, if your partner is not ‘enough’
for you, then you do not really love them. Rather than sexual fidelity being
seen as supportive of love, it becomes equated with it.
However, when questioned about their sexual infidelity, people who have
been unfaithful give a number of different reasons why they did it, many of
which are not to do with love. A large-scale review of studies on infidelity by
Adrian Blow and Kelley Hartnett revealed a number of reasons people give
for cheating, including relationship dissatisfaction, sexual dissatisfaction in
the primary relationship, opportunity, curiosity, desire for excitement, hav-
ing a more permissive attitude towards infidelity, and wanting to get even
with a spouse (Blow and Hartnett 2005). A survey by Glass and Wright
found others, including ‘for fun’, ‘for intellectual sharing’, ‘to feel young’,
‘for novelty and change’, and ‘enhancement of confidence and self-esteem’
(Glass and Wright 1992, p. 372). However, people who commit sexual infi-
delity might find that the reasons they give for their infidelity are not be-
lieved, because the mononormative culture, with its widespread belief in
both moral monogamy and modal monogamy, allows sexual infidelity to
have only certain meanings. If we lived in a society with a culture that did
not equate love with sexual fidelity, or promote the idea that, in love, one
person can and should be ‘enough’ for another, people might be more will-
ing to accept that sexual infidelity need not entail a lack or a loss of love.
Furthermore, being cheated on can feel shameful and humiliating, again
because of the mistaken idea, promoted by the norm of monogamy, that
to be cheated on means you are not ‘enough’ for your partner but that you
should be. It can thus be erroneously taken to imply that there is something
wrong with you. This adds to pressure on people who have been cheated on
to end the relationship, despite howmuch further pain that will cause, rather
than forgive their partner, even if that is what they really want to do
(McKeever 2017, pp. 364–365). It can also be seen to be a matter of pride;
staying with an adulterous partner can make others think that you lack
self-respect, that you do not think yourself good enough to be with someone
for whom you are ‘enough’. Again, this idea is promoted by the norm of
monogamy.
Therefore, in many cases, monogamy norms increase the contingent
harms of sexual infidelity by increasing the likelihood that it will involve de-
ception and by increasing the hurtfulness of it by leading people who have
been cheated on, and those around them, to believe that infidelity means
things, such as that the unfaithful partner no longer loves their partner, when
in fact this might not be true. In a society which that not equate love with
sexual fidelity or promote the idea that one person can and should be
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‘enough’ for another, there would be fewer misconceptions about what infi-
delity entailed about the attitudes or feelings of the unfaithful partner, and
people who have been cheated on would be less likely to feel humiliated or
suffer a loss of pride.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I sought to get greater clarity over the wrong of sexual infidel-
ity. I began by exploring how we might conceive of the wrong. First, sexual
infidelity usually involves hurting one’s partner. I argued that, although the
hurt caused should be taken into account when assessing sexual infidelity, it
does not provide us with a full explanation of why it is wrong, and it might
be better conceived as evidence for the wrong, rather than being constitutive
of it. Second, sexual infidelity often involves deception, and this deception is
particularly serious because it can constitute a kind of free riding if the other
partner is playing by the rules on the assumption that their partner is, but
also because it could undermine sexual consent. However, it seems that it
is the deception, not the sexual infidelity, which is doing the
wrong-making work here, and it is not clear that infidelity with deception
is always worse than infidelity without deception. In any case, as not all sex-
ual infidelity involves hurt or deception, and so neither is an essential feature
of it, I focussed my exploration on commitment-breaking and the sexual na-
ture of the broken commitment. Sexual infidelity is, at root, an infidelity,
that is, a broken commitment, and the commitment is about sexual exclusiv-
ity. I considered in more detail what breaking a commitment to be sexually
exclusive amounts to, arguing that there can be good reasons to commit to
be sexually exclusive, and reasons to be hurt if one partner unilaterally de-
cides to break this agreement. However, it is not clear that sexual infidelity
should be seen as worse than other kinds of infidelity, and the situation be-
comes even harder to assess when no explicit agreement has been made.
This is why a discussion of the rights and wrongs of sexual infidelity needs
to acknowledge the context in which it takes place, and, in particular, the
role that the hegemonic norm of monogamy has in both the prevalence
and the pain of monogamy. Sexual infidelity might not occur so much were
people able to be more honest about their desires with their partners, and if
there were more realistic opportunities for people to engage in consensual
monogamy. And, were the norm less stringent, when sexual infidelity did oc-
cur, it might be less painful and more easily dealt with.
Nonetheless, as I said at the beginning, all this is assuming that the rela-
tionship in question is equal, and that there are no aggravating factors ac-
companying the sexual infidelity. I hazard that, more often than not,
sexual infidelity occurs alongside other serious wrongs and in nonideal
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relationships, and so, in practice, the moral assessment of an instance of sex-
ual infidelity would need to take these other factors into account.
Inter-Disciplinary Ethics Applied (IDEA) Centre
University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
NOTES
1 With some notable exceptions, for example, Wasserstrom (1998), Wreen (1986),
Steinbock (1986), Halwani (1998), and Martin (1998).
2 I thank an anonymous reviewer for helping me to clarify this definition. I acknowledge
that there are arguments, such as those of Michael Wreen (1986), which claim that marriage is
necessarily monogamous, and so even consensual non‐monogamy is wrong. I do not discuss this
kind of argument here, as I want to focus on relationships in which there is an agreement to be
monogamous. I will assume in this paper that consensual non‐monogamy and polyamory are
both possible and not morally troubling.
3 Incidentally, the UK legal definition of adultery specifies that adultery is ‘sexual inter-
course between a consenting man and woman when at least one partner is married to someone
else’, thus entailing that people cannot get a divorce on the grounds of adultery on the basis that
their partner had sex with someone of the same sex as them.
4 The Office for National Statistics data from 2015 shows that marriage rates are now at
their lowest level ever and have been declining since the 1970s (Haines 2015).
5 For an interesting discussion of the problems with using ideal theory in ethics, see
Mills (2005).
6 For an account of lying as manipulation, see Faulkner (2007).
7 Although he does not explicitly discuss sexual infidelity, Tom Dougherty argues that de-
ceiving someone into sex is a serious moral wrong, as it vitiates their consent to sex
(Dougherty 2013).
8 Woollard andWeaver (2008) discuss how sexual infidelitymight be considered a denial of
the value of the sex in the relationship. I discuss their account in more detail below.
9 Wemight also note that sexual infidelity might not involve only the breaking of the com-
mitment to be sexually exclusive; it might also, for example, involve breaking the commitment to
tell your partner everything, or to never deceive them.
10 I am reminded here of Steinbock’s claim that ‘sexual infidelity has significance of a deeper
betrayal – falling in love with someone else’ (Steinbock 1986, p. 14).
11 A recent study using two separate US Census‐based quota samples of single adults in the
USA (over 8000 people in total) found that 21% of Americans have engaged in some form of
consensual non‐monogamy in their lifetime (Haupert et al. 2017).
12 This is a fairly common view found in advice columns, popular magazines, and internet
blogs. See, for example, Engle (2015).
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